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U.S. Ratification of CEDAW:
From Bad to Worse?
Ann M. Piccardt
"[T]he full and complete development of a country, the welfare of
the world and the cause of peace require the maximum
participation of women on equal terms with men in all fields. ..
Introduction
Discrimination against women flourishes in the United
States today.2 However, so does discrimination against the poor,
the disabled, the elderly, Jews,3 immigrants (especially Hispanics
and Latinas), African Americans, and anyone with an Arabic-
sounding last name. This pervasive discrimination continues
despite the fact that the United States has laws that are enforced
to varying degrees, on both state and federal levels, which prohibit
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were invaluable; the help of Professor Jerry Anderson of Drake University Law
School, who also read earlier drafts and who recognized cooptation in my thesis
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1. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women pmbl., opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter
CEDAW].
2. See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,
Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241
(1991) (discussing gender discrimination as it affects women of color).
3. On June 10, 2009, fifty years after the end of World War II, a white
supremacist entered the National Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C. and
opened fire, killing a security guard and wounding several visitors. The accused is
a published author who believes Jews are conspiring to defile the white race, and
that the Holocaust never happened. See Mimi Hall, Marisol Bello & Brad Heath,
Suspect on Anti-Hate Groups'Radar, USA TODAY, June 11, 2009, at 3A.
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such discrimination.4 The subject of this Article is whether the
United States would benefit, or suffer, from ratification of a treaty
that purports to end all forms of discrimination against women.
It has been nearly thirty years since President Jimmy Carter
signed the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),5 and more than ten
years since President Bill Clinton formulated proposed
Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations (RUDs) to
CEDAW.6 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee last met and
reported on the treaty in 2002.7 Despite this progress, the so-
called "Women's Convention" has yet to achieve the advice and
consent of the U.S. Senate, 9 a necessary step for any treaty on the
path to ratification. 10 Many women's rights advocates will no
doubt call upon President Obamall to pick up the torch carried by
4. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006) (prohibiting employment discrimination
based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
46a-64 (West 2009) (prohibiting discrimination in public accommodation by reason
of sex or race); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
5. CEDAW, supra note 1. President Carter signed CEDAW in 1980 and
submitted it to the Senate that same year. See Julie A. Minor, An Analysis of
Structural Weaknesses in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 137, 137 (1994).
6. In both 1994 and 2002, the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
approved eleven Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations which "gutted"
the "clean" treaty signed by President Carter in 1980. Janet Benshoof, How
International Law Could Radically Change the Definition of Gender Equality in the
United States: CEDAW and Reproductive Rights, in GLOBAL JUSTICE CENTER
WHITE PAPER SERIES: "NEW VISIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW AND U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY" 4 (2008), http://www.globaljusticecenter.netprojects/us-foreign-policy/
CEDAWReproductiveRights.pdf. For a discussion of the text of the RUDs proposed
by President Clinton, see infra notes 96-114 and accompanying text.
7. Treaty Doc. 96-53; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on
December 18, 1979, and Signed on Behalf of the United States of America on July
17, 1980: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 107th Cong. (2002)
[hereinafter 2002 Hearing]. The report is about 150 pages and details arguments
in favor of and in opposition to U.S. ratification of CEDAW. It contains formal
statements submitted by many groups, including, but not limited to, the following:
the American Bar Association, id. at 85-86; Hadassah, the Women's Zionist
Organization of America, id. at 93; the American Association of University Women,
id. at 85; Amnesty International USA, id. at 86-89; NOW Legal Defense and
Education Fund, id. at 105-10; the Heritage Foundation, id. at 127-40; the Family
Action Council International, id. at 122-25; American Life League, id. at 140; and
the Family Research Council, id. at 143-44.
8. Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 643, 643 (1990).
9. See 2002 Hearing, supra note 7, at 1 (statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden,
Jr., Chairman, S. Comm. on Foreign Relations).
10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
11. Barack Obama was elected the forty-fourth president of the United States
in November 2008, and took office on January 20, 2009. Peter Baker, Obama Takes
[Vol. 28:119
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the Democratic Presidents who preceded him and make
ratification of CEDAW a priority for his administration. 12 The
goals of the Women's Convention are indisputably laudable.
Ending discrimination in any form, against any group, can do
nothing but improve the state of humanity.
The question that must be asked, unfortunately, is whether
ratification of CEDAW by the United States 13 would, in fact,
actually do anything to eliminate discrimination against women in
this country. The broader underlying question, of course, is
whether international law influences a nation's behavior or simply
reflects it, particularly in respect to human rights treaties. 14 If
nothing else, the nature and content of the RUDs that were
formulated by the Clinton administration 5 may so severely
conflict with CEDAW's object and purpose that any ratification
would be meaningless. Furthermore, ratification under these
conditions and in the current circumstances could not have a
meaningful impact on the lives of women in the United States if
enabling legislation is not forthcoming. 16 In fact, ratification could
have a negative effect on the United States' human rights record
in general' 7 and on the lives of U.S. women specifically.' 8
Oath, and Nation in Crisis Embraces the Moment, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2009, at Al.
Presidents Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton, like President Obama, were elected as
Democrats.
12. See, e.g., Benshoof, supra note 6, at 2 ("The overwhelming mandate for
change given to the new Obama administration is a transformational event which
presents an opportunity for the United States to embrace a new vision of its role in
the world and in promoting global justice.").
13. See infra note 39 (discussing the definition of ratification and accession).
14. See LOUIS HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 88 (2d ed. 1979) ("Nations act in
conformity with law not from any concern for law but because they consider it in
their interest to do so, and fear unpleasant consequences if they do not observe
it.... Nations would probably behave about the same way if there were no law.").
15. See infra notes 97-114 and accompanying text.
16. CEDAW, like other human rights treaties, is not considered by the United
States to be self-executing and would thus require enabling legislation before it
would have any effect whatsoever. See Minor, supra note 5, at 142 (stating the
proposition that "treaties should be construed in a 'broad and liberal spirit"' but
noting that "the courts have not approached human rights treaties in this way,
almost uniformly holding that human rights clauses are non-self-executing."
(quoting Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342 (1924))); see also Julian G. Ku,
Medellin's Clear Statement Rule: A Solution for International Delegations, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 609, 613 (2008) (explaining the position of the Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States that "unless there is a manifestation of
an intent toward non-self-execution, the background presumption is that all
treaties are self-executing.").
17. See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a
Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002) (presenting empirical research indicating
that countries' human rights performances may actually decrease rather than
increase after ratification of human rights treaties).
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This Article explores the possibility that ratification of
CEDAW ought not be a priority for the Obama administration
because women will continue to face discrimination, and may
actually fare worse, if the treaty is ratified. Until the United
States as a nation, and its citizens as individuals, truly internalize
the goals of CEDAW and accept its anti-discriminatory purposes
as the norm, ratification may do more harm than good. 19
Part I of this Article provides the history, background, and
context for CEDAW, including the proposed RUDs, and discusses
the United States' failure to ratify CEDAW. Part II examines the
type of enabling legislation that would be necessary for CEDAW to
take effect in the United States even if it is ultimately ratified.
Part III analyzes the United States' failure to ratify CEDAW and
whether that failure means anything in the day-to-day lives of
U.S. women. Part IV asks whether the time for a women's treaty
may have already come and gone. The final Part of this Article
concludes that internalization of the treaty's objects and purposes,
rather than pro forma ratification, should be the goal of the United
States.
I. The Evolution of CEDAW and the United States'
Response
Expressions of concern about equality for women have been
clearly articulated for as long as there have been international
human rights instruments. 20 The preamble to the United Nations
Charter specifically reaffirms "faith in fundamental human rights,
in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights
of men and women... "21 However, many in the international
community came to see this approach to women's equality via
18. See infra notes 163-172 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility
that ratification of CEDAW might give the United States an opportunity to
institutionalize discrimination against women in this country).
19. See Hathaway, supra note 17; infra notes 161-169 and accompanying text.
20. See Dorota Gierycz, Human Rights of Women at the Fiftieth Anniversary of
the United Nations, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: INTERNATIONAL
INSTRUMENTS AND AFRICAN EXPERIENCES 30, 31 (Wolfgang Benedek et al. eds.,
2002) (describing, inter alia, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the
International Covenants on Human Rights, and the two Optional Protocols to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights-known collectively as the
International Bill of Human Rights-as formulating "contemporary legal
standards" that "are derived from universally recognized principles, which state
that human rights are attributed to human beings only; that they are attributed to
all human beings equally... and that they are rights of which no person can be
deprived, and which no one can take away or violate without legal consequences.").
21. U.N. Charter pmbl.
[Vol. 28:119
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general human rights treaties as "fragmentary"22 and felt the need
for a treaty that focused exclusively on eliminating discrimination
against women. 23
CEDAW encompasses many provisions that were originally
contained in other conventions, declarations, and covenants that
addressed human rights issues specifically as they pertained to
women.24  It is clear from such initiatives as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,25 the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 26 the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,2 7 and the World Conference
of the International Women's Year, 28 that the international
community had previously attempted to define human rights
issues as being equally relevant for women and men. 29 CEDAW,
22. United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, Short History of
CEDAW Convention, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/history.htm (last
visited October 12, 2009) [hereinafter Short History].
23. Id. The U.N. website states unequivocally:
Equality of rights for women is a basic principle of the United
Nations.... By the terms of the Charter, the first international
instrument to refer specifically to human rights and to the equal rights of
men and women, all members of the United Nations are legally bound to
strive towards the full realization of all human rights and fundamental
freedoms. The status of human rights, including the goal of equality
between women and men, is thereby elevated: a matter of ethics becomes a
contractual obligation of all Governments and of the UN.
Id.
24. Cook, supra note 8. Cook explains:
The Women's Convention is one of a series of treaties inspired by a vision
of the importance of protection of human rights through international law.
It is historically proximate to the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. .. and a
jurisprudential partner to the two Covenants that give effect to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights [referring to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights].
Id. at 644-45.
25. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71, art. 7,
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
26. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, adopted Dec. 19,
1966, S. TREATY Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
27. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 3,
adopted Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY Doc. No. 95-19, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
28. World Conference of the International Women's Year, G.A. Res. 3520, U.N.
GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 95, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975).
29. For other international instruments that specifically refer to protecting
women, see the Convention on the Political Rights of Women, opened for signature
Mar. 31, 1953, 27 U.S.T. 1909, 193 U.N.T.S. 135; the Convention on the Nationality
of Married Women, done Feb. 20, 1957, 309 U.N.T.S. 65; and the Convention on
Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages,
opened for signature Dec. 10, 1962, 521 U.N.T.S. 231. For a first-hand account of
the evolution of the international community's approach to women's rights as
human rights and the United States' role therein, see ARVONNE FRASER, SHE'S NO
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then, was hailed as "provid[ing] in a single document the current
international consensus on a diverse set of topics."30  However,
even a generation ago there was concern about whether CEDAW
alone was enough to have any practical impact on the quality of
women's lives. 31 Implementation of CEDAW by states parties has
long been an area of concern. 32
One forerunner to CEDAW was the Declaration on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,33 adopted by the
United Nations in 1967. 34 The Declaration has been described as a
"statement of moral and political intent"35 and, unlike a treaty, it
had no legal effect. 36 The 1960s and 1970s saw an increased
awareness of the need for human rights treaties, most of which
expressly provided that men and women are equal.37 The United
Nations adopted CEDAW on December 18, 1979, and it entered
into force on September 3, 1981. 38 One hundred eighty-six
LADY: POLITICS, FAMILY, AND INTERNATIONAL FEMINISM (Lori Sturdevant ed.,
2007).
30. NATALIE KAUFMAN HEVENER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATUS OF
WOMEN 46 (1983). The United States has not ratified CEDAW yet, suggesting that
it does not join in any such consensus.
31. See id. at 47.
32. Id. Writing more than twenty-five years ago, Professor Hevener noted that
"[t]he next crucial step is the further development of strategies for the
implementation of the rules and principles set forth in [CEDAW]." She proposed
three steps toward implementation: first, she urged more states to ratify CEDAW;
second, she recommended that more attention be paid to the World Plan of Action
and the Copenhagen Programme of Action, "two non-treaty instruments which are
highly significant policy statements;" and third, "although a great deal can be done
at the national level, regional and global intergovernmental and nongovernmental
groups, have a continuing and essential role to play in stimulating and supporting
national action as well as implementing within their agencies and programs the
proposals and objectives presented in these instruments." Id. at 47-48.
33. Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res.
48/104, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 217, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993).
34. Short History, supra note 22.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 25, pmbl.
(stating the United Nations "reaffirm[s] ... the equal rights of men and
women..."); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
supra note 27, art. 3 ("The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to
ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social
and cultural rights set forth in the present Covenant."); International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, supra note 26, art. 3 (mirroring the statement in the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).
38. For an excellent overview of CEDAW, see Andrew Byrnes, The Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, in THE HUMAN
RIGHTS OF WOMEN: INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND AFRICAN EXPERIENCES,
supra note 20, at 119, 119-20. In this piece, Byrnes argues:
Although there had been many statements in international instruments
promising equality and non-discrimination on the basis of sex - some in
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countries have ratified or acceded 39 to it,40 which is more than
ninety-five percent of the members of the United Nations.4 1 The
remaining non-states parties are currently limited to Iran,
binding instruments, others in non-binding declarations - there was no
comprehensive and detailed charter of equality for women under
international law....
The Convention can be viewed from a number of perspectives. It is a
political manifesto, clearly declaring the right of women to equality and
non-discrimination; it is also an international legal instrument (a treaty),
as well as providing a framework or point of reference for policy-making,
lobbying and social activism.
Id.
39. Ratification is the formal process by which a "legislature confirms the
government's action in signing a treaty" and the government may "become bound
by the agreement." DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 274 (3d
ed. 2003). Accession is the "process of becoming a party to, or legally bound by, a
treaty without formal action." Id. at 3.
40. United Nations, United Nations Treaty Collection: Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
http://treaties.un.org/PageslViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=lV-
8&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Nov. 28, 2009) [hereinafter UNTC: CEDAW].
The following countries are states parties to CEDAW as of this writing:
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina,
Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia & Herzegovina,
Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile,
China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cbte d'Ivoire, Croatia,
Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji,
Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada,
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland,
India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan,
Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia,
Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan A. Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall
Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Monaco, Mongolia,
Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea,
Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts & Nevis,
Saint Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome &
Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname,
Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, The
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago,
Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates,
United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland, United Republic of
Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia,
and Zimbabwe. Id.
41. Rebecca L. Hillock, Establishing the Rights of Women Globally: Has the
United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women Made a Difference?, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 481, 483 (2005).
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Somalia, Sudan, the United States, and very few others.42
CEDAW "calls for Parties to eliminate discrimination
against women in all areas of life, including health care,
education, employment, domestic relations, law, commercial
transactions, and political participation."43  Discrimination is
defined to encompass every distinction made on the basis of sex
that would interfere with women's rights to equality with men in
any area of life. 44
The substantive terms of the treaty are contained in its first
sixteen articles. 45  In addition to defining prohibited
42. Compare UNTC: CEDAW, supra note 40 (listing states parties to CEDAW),
with United Nations Member States, http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml
(last visited Nov. 28, 2009) (listing United Nations member states). The remaining
U.N. members that have not yet ratified CEDAW are Nauru, Palau, and Tonga. Id.
43. LuISA BLANCHFIELD, THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS
OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN (CEDAW): CONGRESSIONAL ISSUES, at
summary (2008).
44. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 1. The full definition of discrimination is as
follows:
'[D]iscrimination against women' shall mean any distinction, exclusion or
restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of
impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women,
irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and
women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political,
economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.
Id.
45. Articles 17 through 30 establish the Committee and set forth the
administrative and procedural mechanisms for CEDAW itself. See CEDAW supra
note 1, art. 17. See infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text (discussing the
Committee's composition and functions). Article 17 provides that the Committee
consists of "twenty-three experts of high moral standing and competence in the
field covered by the Convention." CEDAW supra note 1, art. 17. Each state party
may nominate one of its nationals, and the selection is made by secret vote among
states parties. Id. Article 18 requires each state party to prepare and submit to
the Committee a report on its efforts at compliance with CEDAW within one year
after ratification of or accession to the Convention; after the inaugural year, reports
are due every four years. See id., art. 18. Article 19 permits the Committee to set
its own procedures and elect its own officers, and Article 20 describes when and
where the Committee should normally meet (every two years at the U.N.
headquarters). See id. arts. 19-20. Article 21 requires the Committee, through the
Economic and Social Council, to report annually to the General Assembly, and
Article 22 permits the Committee to request reports from specialized agencies
whose work overlaps with the subject of CEDAW. See id. arts. 21-22. Article 23 is
significant in that it clearly states that any state party may make provisions that
provide more protections for equality between men and women than are provided
in CEDAW, and that such enhanced protections will in no way be seen to conflict
with CEDAW. See id. art. 23. Article 24 requires all states parties to take every
domestic measure necessary to fulfill their obligations under CEDAW. See id. art.
24. Articles 25 through 30 address the details of opening CEDAW for signature,
assigning the depository for CEDAW, designating the Secretary General as the
recipient of requests to revise CEDAW, establishing the dates of entry into force for
CEDAW, addressing the method for resolving disputes about CEDAW among
states parties, and identifying the languages in which CEDAW is authenticated
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discrimination, CEDAW provides that states parties must
condemn that discrimination and agree to eliminate it by enacting
and enforcing appropriate legislative and constitutional
measures; 46 commits states parties to take similar measures to
"ensure the full development and advancement of women;"47
protects and permits affirmative measures taken to eliminate
discrimination against women even if those measures involve
temporary discrimination against men;48 requires states parties to
undertake the elimination of cultural, social, and political
stereotyping of men and women while recognizing maternity as a
legitimate social function;49 and requires states parties to take
measures to end trafficking in women as well as exploitation and
prostitution of women. 50
Part II of CEDAW provides that states parties must ensure
women the right to vote and the right to fully participate in their
countries' governments; 51 must ensure that women have an equal
right to represent their country at the international level;52 and
must give women "equal rights with men to acquire, change, or
retain their nationality" and that of their children.5 3 Part III
(which is standard in any treaty implementation). See id. arts. 25-30.
46. CEDAW supra note 1, art. 3.
47. Id.
48. Id. art. 4. This provision is similar to affirmative action that is permissible
in the United States to redress certain past patterns of discrimination.
49. Id. art. 5. Article 5 requires states parties to "modify the social and cultural
patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of
prejudices and.., other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or
the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and
women .. " Id. It also requires states parties to "ensure that family education
includes a proper understanding of maternity as a social function and the
recognition of the common responsibility of men and women in the upbringing and
development of their children .. " Id.
50. Id. art. 6 (requiring states parties to "take all appropriate measures,
including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of
prostitution of women").
51. Id. art. 7. ("States parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in the political and public life of the country
and... shall ensure to women, on equal terms with men, the right: [t]o vote... [t]o
participate in the formulation of government policy and the implementation
thereof... [and t]o participate in non-governmental organizations and associations
concerned with the public and political life of the country.").
52. Id. art. 8 ("States parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure to
women, on equal terms with men and without any discrimination, the opportunity
to represent their Governments at the international level and to participate in the
work of international organizations.").
53. Id. art. 9(1) ("States Parties ... shall ensure in particular that neither
marriage to an alien nor change of nationality by the husband during marriage
shall automatically change the nationality of the wife, render her stateless or force
upon her the nationality of the husband.").
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requires that women have rights equal to men in the areas of
education, 54 employment, 55 and health care,5 6 and that women be
granted full participation in economic and social life (including the
ability to obtain credit).5 7  Particular forms of discrimination
encountered by women in rural areas are also addressed in Part
111.58 Part IV of the treaty requires states parties to guarantee
women rights equal to men in all areas of the law and of civil life,59
and to "eliminate discrimination against women in all matters
relating to marriage and family relations."60
Undoubtedly, CEDAW has had some beneficial impact
54. Id. art. 10(a), (c), (d), (g) (stating that states parties shall "ensure, on a basis
of equality of men and women" access to educational opportunities from pre-school
through higher education, in rural as well as urban areas, the elimination of
stereotypes, and equal access to scholarships and grants, continuing education,
sports and physical fitness, and family planning information).
55. Id. art. 11(1)-(2) (stating that states parties are required to ensure "[t]he
right to work as an inalienable right of all human beings" and are required to take
measures "to prevent discrimination against women on the grounds of marriage or
maternity and to ensure their effective right to work").
56. Id. art. 12(1)-(2) (stating that states parties shall ensure "access to health
care services, including those related to family planning" and guarantee services
"in connexion [sic] with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal period, granting
free services where necessary, as well as adequate nutrition during pregnancy and
lactation").
57. Id. art. 13(a)-(c) (stating that women should be guaranteed equal rights to
"family benefits," to "bank loans, mortgages and other forms of financial credit,"
and "to participate in recreational activities, sports and all aspects of cultural life").
58. Id. art. 14(1)-(2) ("States Parties shall take into account the particular
problems faced by rural women and the significant roles which rural women play in
the economic survival of their families .... States Parties shall ... ensure ... that
[women] participate in and benefit from rural development .. ").
59. Id. art. 15(1)-(2) ("States Parties shall accord to women equality with men
before the law .... States Parties shall accord to women, in civil matters, a legal
capacity identical to that of men and the same opportunities to exercise that
capacity."). Importantly, if somewhat incongruently, this article further provides
that "States Parties shall accord to men and women the same rights with regard to
the law relating to the movement of persons and the freedom to choose their
residence and domicile." Id. art. 15(4).
60. Id. art. 16(1)(b)-(h). Specifically, CEDAW provides that states parties shall
ensure that women have the same rights as men to choose whether and to whom
they will marry, as well as
[t]he same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its
dissolution... [t]he same rights and responsibilities as parents... [t]he
same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of
their children ... [tihe same rights and responsibilities with regard to
guardianship, wardship, trusteeship and adoption of children... [t]he
same personal rights as husband and wife, including the right to choose a
family name, a profession and an occupation [and t]he same rights for both
spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition, management,
administration, enjoyment and disposition of property, whether free of
charge or for a valuable consideration.
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around the globe. In one specific example, the South African
Constitution utilized CEDAW to set the framework for
reproductive health rights for women. 61  Within other states
parties, CEDAW has been utilized to bring domestic actions to
enforce women's rights to be free from discrimination. 62 It is
indisputable that in some parts of the world, CEDAW has had,
and continues to have, important beneficial impacts on the lives of
women who previously had no right to be free from discrimination,
and whose cultures, perhaps, did not previously consider such a
right worth codifying. 63
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women (Committee) was established under Article 17 of CEDAW
"for the purpose of considering the progress made in
implementation of [CEDAW] ... "64 The Committee was thus
charged with monitoring states parties' compliance, or progress
toward compliance, with CEDAW's requirements. 65 Every state
61. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 27 (guaranteeing a right to reproductive
health care services); see also Charles Ngwena, An Appraisal of Abortion Laws in
Southern Africa from a Reproductive Health Rights Perspective, 32 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 708, 715-16 (2004) ("[Iln Section 27, the [South African] Constitution
acknowledges a right to health care services, including reproductive health
services.... Section 27 implicitly impresses upon the state that the provision of
abortion services is not a privilege but a right which imposes a corresponding duty
on the state and that abortion services are as important as any services .... In this
way, the South African Constitution has internalized the values and obligations
that are expected of governments under article 12 of the [International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights], article 12 of CEDAW and article 16 of
the African Charter on Human and People's Rights... in respect of the right to
health.").
62. Nora O'Connell & Ritu Sharma, Treaty for the Rights of Women Deserves
Full U.S. Support, 10 HuM. RTS. BRIEF, Winter 2003, at 22, 22 ("In Turkey,
CEDAW was used to rescind a government policy that forced female students to
undergo virginity exams. In Tanzania, the High Court cited CEDAW in striking
down a law that prevented women from inheriting clan land from their
fathers.... In Colombia, courts have cited CEDAW in their rulings to provide legal
recourse to female victims of domestic violence .... India's ratification of CEDAW
was followed by an increase in girls' education."). These authors urge the United
States to ratify CEDAW because "[t]he United States has much to offer as new
democracies look for guidance on how to bring women's rights into the 21st
century." Id.
63. It is probably also true, however, that in some states, particularly developed
Western states, CEDAW has had no quantifiable impact. See Minor, supra note 5,
at 143 ("Thirteen years after entering into force, it is clear that the Convention has
not brought about the revolutionary changes in women's rights that its provisions
mandate.").
64. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 17(1).
65. See id. arts. 18-21. The Committee has been accused of activism and its
work was the subject of concern when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last
considerated CEDAW. See, e.g., 2002 Hearing, supra note 7, at 11-13 (statement of
Rep. Jo Ann Davis) ("It is the work product of this implementing committee that I
want to focus my testimony upon today .... ). The Committee's work has also
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party has the right to nominate a representative for membership
on the Committee. 66 States parties are required to submit reports
on their implementation of CEDAW,67 and the Committee reviews
those reports.68 For states parties, the reporting process is the
only measure of their compliance with CEDAW.69
Like most treaties, CEDAW contains no provision whereby
an individual or non-governmental organization (NGO) may bring
a complaint for violation of the treaty.70 In 1976, when CEDAW
been criticized by Rebecca Hillock, who wrote that the Committee has put forth a
"radical feminist agenda" and "has made it very clear.., that where religious,
traditional, or sacred norms clash with their [sic] radical feminist interpretation of
the Convention, those norms will be targeted for reinterpretation and deletion by
the countries who [sic] implement them." Hillock, supra note 41, at 503, 507-08.
Whether, as Hillock argues, this "radical feminist agenda" justifies the United
States' refusal to ratify CEDAW is not the subject of this Article. As Senator
Barbara Boxer said, "the Committee cannot in any way force any government to
change its laws or adopt the opinions that they [sic] are expressing. If we have to
clarify that, we will. We will take care of that problem." 2002 Hearing, supra note
7, at 7 (statement of Sen. Barbara Boxer).
66. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 17(2) ("Each State Party may nominate one
person from among its own nationals.").
67. Id. art. 18(1) (requiring states parties to submit reports on the measures
they have adopted "to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention" for
review by the Committee).
68. Id. art. 21(1) (stating that the Committee will review the reports and make
"suggestions and general recommendations" for the states parties). Such a report
and review procedure is not uncommon for human rights treaties, and the reports
form the basis for much of Oona Hathaway's research on the human rights records
of states parties. See Hathaway, infra note 157. While the Committee reports have
no binding effect, they were the subject of much of the U.S. Senate's concerns about
the effect ratification of CEDAW would have on U.S. sovereignty. See, e.g., 2002
Hearing, supra note 7, at 7 (statement of Sen. Barbara Boxer) ("I also understand
there are concerns the CEDAW committee established by the treaty somehow
interferes with the sovereignty of the United States.").
69. The lack of enforcement mechanism is a drawback that is typical of human
rights treaties, and that lies at the heart of many frustrations with international
human rights law in general. There are no repercussions in terms of money or
power for noncompliance with human rights treaties. See Hathaway, supra note
17, at 1938. This lack of consequences can be seen in the list of 186 states parties
to CEDAW. See UNTC: CEDAW, supra note 40. Many of the countries on that list
have notoriously bad human rights records, particularly when it comes to women,
yet they are all, unlike the United States, parties to CEDAW. See Hathaway,
supra note 17, at 1938 (suggesting that ratification by non-democratic states may
be associated with worse human rights practices).
70. See CEDAW, supra note 1. The very entities that are protected by human
rights treaties, individual citizens, generally have no means by which to bring
complaints about a lack of enforcement or implementation on the part of the states
parties to the treaty. Cf. Tom Obokata, Smuggling of Human Beings from a
Human Rights Perspective: Obligation of Non-State and State Actors Under
International Human Rights Law, 17 INVL J. REFUGEE L. 394, 403 (2005) ("The
traditional view is that States are the bearers of obligations under international
law. This derives from the idea that States are the subject of international law
with direct rights and responsibilities.").
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was in the drafting phase, some U.N. delegates proposed adding a
complaints procedure.71 Other delegates, however, argued
successfully that such a complaints procedure was inappropriate
in a women's treaty.72 In 1993, the World Conference on Human
Rights in Vienna "acknowledged the need for new procedures to
strengthen implementation of women's human rights. 73  An
Optional Protocol 74 was adopted by the United Nations in 1999,
entered into force in 2000, and has so far been ratified by ninety-
nine states parties.7 5 The Optional Protocol is significant because
of its creation of a process whereby individuals and groups, rather
than only states parties, may lodge complaints of violations of
CEDAW with the Committee.7 6 Other articles of the Optional
Protocol detail the manner in which complaints may be received by
the Committee and provide for protection of the identities of
individuals or groups that submit complaints. 77  The United
71. See United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, History of an
Optional Protocol, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/history.htm
(last visited Oct. 2, 2009).
72. See id. ("During the drafting of CEDAW, a complaints procedure was
suggested .... Some delegates argued that complaints procedures were needed for
,serious international crimes' such as apartheid and racial discrimination, rather
than discrimination against women.").
73. Id.
74. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women art. 2, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1999, 2131
U.N.T.S. 83 [hereinafter Optional Protocol].
75. United Nations, United Nations Treaty Collection: Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
http://treaties.un.org/PagesNiewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg
_no=IV-8-b&chapter=4&lang-en (last visited Nov. 30, 2009) [hereinafter UNTC:
Optional Protocol]. For an in-depth examination of the Optional Protocol, see Bal
Sokhi-Bulley, The Optional Protocol to CEDAW: First Steps, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV.
143, 143 (2006) (arguing that "the primary purpose of the [Optional Protocol] is to
attain improved enforcement of women's rights." (emphasis added)).
76. See Optional Protocol, supra note 74, art. 2 (explaining that complaints are
referred to as "communications" and they may be submitted to the Committee "by
or on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals").
77. Id. arts. 2-3, 6. It is worth noting that no reservations are permitted to the
Optional Protocol, unlike the treaty itself whose reservation procedure has been the
subject of criticism. See Cook, supra note 8, at 643-44 (pointing out that "[t]he rate
and extent of ratification are tempered, however, by recognition of the acute
problem of substantive reservations. The volume of reservations brings this
Convention among the most heavily reserved of international human rights
conventions, with at least 23 of 100 states parties making a total of 88 substantive
reservations."). Professor Cook noted, nearly twenty years ago:
Legal assessment of reservations to the Women's Convention is currently
based on a body of law permeated by uncertainties and varied, sometimes
inconsistent, theoretical approaches situated at different points on the
spectrum between aims of universal application of the Convention and of
preservation of its integrity. Women continue to experience discrimination
in the very areas that states parties to the Convention have committed
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States, obviously, is not a party to the Optional Protocol because it
is not a party to the treaty itself.78
The United States has a history of resisting ratification of
human rights treaties in general.7 9 The resistance to CEDAW is
just one example.80 For as long as there have been human rights
treaties, the United States, and particularly the Senate, has
balked at joining or committing to them.8' At the heart of U.S.
resistance to human rights treaties may be the notion of
sovereignty and the all-encompassing supremacy of the U.S.
Constitution, and its delineation of state and federal powers,82 or
themselves to eliminate. Discrimination is particularly subversive of the
Convention when states parties justify it by reference to reservations made
under the regime of the Convention itself.
Id. at 707-08; see also Jennifer Riddle, Making CEDAW Universal: A Critique of
CEDAW's Reservation Regime Under Article 28 and the Effectiveness of the
Reporting Process, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 605, 613-19 (2002) (discussing
CEDAW's reservation procedure).
78. See UNTC: Optional Protocol, supra note 75.
79. For example, the United States has not yet ratified the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, one of the three pieces of the
International Bill of Rights, despite the fact that it was signed by President Jimmy
Carter in 1977. See United Nations, United Nations Treaty Collection:
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=IV-
3&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Oct. 20, 2009) (showing the United States
signed the treaty on October 5, 1977). The United States has also failed to ratify
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3. See United Nations, United Nations Treaty Collection: Convention on
the Rights of the Child, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg.no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en (last
visited Oct. 15, 2009). For all human rights treaties and their participants, see
United Nations, United Nations Treaty Collection: Multilateral Treaties Deposited
with the Secretary General, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx
(last visited Oct. 3, 2009). See also NATALIE HEVENER KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES AND THE SENATE: A HISTORY OF OPPOSITION 2 (1990) ("The major
argument of this book is that current opposition to human rights treaties is a
legacy of the 1950s .... Although the current political, social, legal, and economic
environment differs significantly from that of the 1950s, the articulated opposition
to human rights treaties in the United States Senate has changed very little.").
80. See KAUFMAN, supra note 79, at 2.
81. See Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
Relative to the Making of Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearings Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong. 475 (1952) (statement of Sen. John W. Bricker)
[hereinafter Treaties Hearings] ("My purpose in offering this resolution is to bury
the so-called Covenant on Human Rights so deep that no one holding high public
office will ever dare to attempt its resurrection."); see also Amy C. Harfeld, Oh
Righteous Delinquent One: The United States' International Human Rights Double
Standard-Explanation, Example, and Avenues for Change, 4 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 59,
68 (2001) (arguing that "[b]y failing to ratify many other human rights treaties, and
by incorporating self-defeating reservations into those that we have ratified, the
United States has not abandoned Senator Bricker's vision" of rendering
international human rights treaties useless).
82. See U.S. CONST. arts. I-IV.
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of the Declaration of Independence, with its guarantee of certain
"unalienable" rights for "all Men."8 3
In 1951, Senator John Bricker vowed to "bury" even the
possibility of the United States agreeing to any human rights
treaty.8 4 By 2000, Senator Jesse Helms was still vilifying the
United Nations and touting U.S. sovereignty as superior to
international law.8 5 There appears to be a persistent fear within
the United States that human rights treaties will weaken U.S.
sovereignty, or somehow change the face of the country altogether.
Indeed, human rights treaties have been demonized in the U.S.
Senate as having the potential to change the face of the nation.8 6
One example of this deeply ingrained suspicion about U.S.
involvement in international law can be seen in the following
quote, which demonstrates a 1950s era perspective:
By and through treaty law-making the federal government can
be transformed into a completely socialistic and centralized
state. It only requires that the present provisions of the
Declaration on Human Rights be incorporated into a
treaty... to change the relationship between the states and
the federal government and to change even our Constitution
and our form of government. ... It is not an overstatement to
say that the republic is threatened to its very foundations.8 7
83. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
84. Treaties Hearings, supra note 81, at 475 (statement of Sen. John W.
Bricker). Senator John Bricker represented Ohio in the U.S. Senate from 1947-59.
Bricker, John, Biographical Directory of the United States Congress,
http:/bioguide.congress.gov/scriptsfbiodisplay.pl?index=B000820 (last visited Oct 3,
2009).
85. See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy ed., Contemporary Practice of the United States
Relating to International Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 348, 351 (2000) ("[The American
people] see the UN aspiring to establish itself as the central authority of a new
international order of global laws and global governance." (quoting Senator
Helms)). The divisiveness of Senator Helms' positions on many issues can be seen
in the fact that in June 2009, a full year after his death, "[t]wenty-six North
Carolina legislators sat out a vote... honoring the late U.S. Sen. Jesse Helms,
showing that the Republican remains a polarizing figure a year after his
death.... Most of the holdouts were black Democrats." Emery P. Dalesio, 26 NC
Lawmakers Sit Out of Helms Resolution Vote, ABC NEWS, June 9, 2009,
http://abcnews.go.comJUS/wireStory?id=7798698. Senator Jesse Helms
represented North Carolina in the Senate from 1973-2003. Helms, Jesse,
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, http://bioguide.congress.gov/
scriptsfbiodisplay.pl?index=H00463 (last visited Oct. 14, 2009).
86. See, e.g., KAUFMAN, supra note 79, at 116 (describing the range of
arguments raised in Senate hearings against human rights treaties as "abrogation
of states' rights by the federal government, .. . advancement of
communism[,] ... deterioration of U.S. sovereignty, moving toward world
government[,] and weakening of the U.S. constitutional system, including
constitutional protection of individual rights").
87. Id. at 9 (quoting FRANK HOLMAN, TREATY LAw-MAKING (1950)) (detailing
the history of Frank Holman's "crusade" to keep the United States out of the
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Whether concerns about federalism are legitimate or are instead a
political agenda in disguise8 8 may never be known, but the fact
remains that the U.S. Senate is reluctant to grant its advice and
consent to human rights treaties in general, and to CEDAW in
particular.8 9
Sovereignty, of course, lies at the heart of every
international agreement.90 Why states comply with treaties when
there is no enforcement mechanism is the subject of much
debate. 91 In very general terms, states do what works in their own
best interests. Machiavelli observed that "a prudent ruler cannot
keep his word, nor should he, where such fidelity would damage
him, and when the reasons that made him promise are no longer
relevant. '92 In the case of human rights treaties, the reasons for a
international human rights arena completely). Raising the possibility of socialism
is still a political "kiss of death," as the Clintons learned in relation to health care
in the 1990s. Cf. Heidi Przybyla, Socialism Threat Has Long History for Health-
Care Overhaul Foes, BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 14, 2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aydOJxPgHII ("In
1993, the health-insurance industry tried to scuttle President Bill Clinton's
proposed overhaul by funding ads featuring a fictional couple who decried a
'government takeover' of health care."). For a comprehensive analysis of federalism
concerns, see Margaret E. McGuinness, Foreword, 73 MO. L. REV. 921 (2008). "To
the minds of Holman and Bricker, the sweeping precedent set by [the Supreme
Court in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920)] would permit international legal
commitments to blanket the sky - not unlike the migration of the passenger
pigeons of yore - blotting out the police powers of the states and overshadowing the
limitations on congressional and presidential power." Id. at 925.
88. Federalism concerns in this context bring to mind the old rallying cry of
states' rights as a justification for institutionalizing and permitting racial
segregation in the United States. See KAUFMAN, supra note 79, at 185 ("A second
persistent threat that opponents to the Genocide Convention posed was its effect on
states' rights. In the 1950s this argument was developed as a defense of racial
segregation and state jurisdiction over acts of racial violence. Fears were expressed
that the federal government would, through the Genocide Convention, legitimize
intervention in race riots, lynchings, and other violence against blacks.").
89. See 2002 Hearing, supra note 7, at 7 (addressing concerns regarding
ratification of CEDAW); KAUFMAN, supra note 79, at 29-36 (discussing the history
of Congress' opposition to human rights treaties).
90. HENKIN, supra note 14, at 89 n.* ("I know of no satisfying jurisprudential
explanation as to why a nation cannot totally reject international law. The most
plausible reason is rooted in 'consensus': ultimately, all nations desire 'the system,'
whatever they may think of it .... And, in fact, no modern nation has rejected 'the
system,' and governments (if not academics) have stopped asking why they are
subject to international law.").
91. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY 3
(1995) (suggesting a "managerial model" as a theory to explain why nations comply,
relying "primarily on a cooperative, problem-solving approach instead of a coercive
one"). As the authors acknowledge, a complete lack of sanctions is problematic: "It
is less easy to give a succinct and satisfying description of this alternative to
sanctions," and thus most of their book is "devoted to the attempt." Id. at 3.
92. NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 61-62 (Quentin Skinner & Russell
Prince eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1532).
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nation to commit are less clear than in, for example, a trade
agreement wherein the states parties stand to gain or lose money
depending on their compliance. Human rights treaties are
distinguishable from other types of treaties because the benefits of
the treaty flow to individual citizens rather than to the state itself,
leaving the state no tangible or quantifiable incentive to comply.93
But compliance, to the extent that it is an issue at all in human
rights treaties, is only an issue after a state has ratified a treaty.
At this point, because ratification is not in the foreseeable future,
compliance with CEDAW is a non-issue for the United States.
II. Is Ratification a Possibility?
The U.S. Constitution provides that the President may make
only those treaties which are consented to by two-thirds of the
Senate. 94 Thus, President Carter's signature of CEDAW in 1980
has had no legal effect whatsoever because the Senate has yet to
consent.95 Similarly, the RUDs proposed by President Clinton and
subsequently approved by various Senate Committees on Foreign
Relations, in 1994 and again in 2002, are of no practical or legal
effect. 96 The RUDs are, however, indicative of the United States'
reasons for declining to ratify CEDAW.
President Clinton proposed the RUDs in his efforts to move
CEDAW through the Senate. 97 In their broadest sense, the United
States' reservations would render CEDAW inapplicable in the
United States (if it were ever ratified) insofar as it contains any
provisions that might conflict with, or in any way affect, domestic
93. Economic sanctions, for example, are not available for a breach of a human
rights treaty, as they might be for a breach of a trade agreement. See Riddle, supra
note 77, at 624 ("Human rights treaties are different from contract-like treaties
because there are no direct advantages or disadvantages to the state parties.").
94. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
95. Presidents are free to sign treaties; however, they will not enter into force
until they are ratified by the Senate. See Harfeld, supra note 81, at 75 ("States
express their support for the principles of a treaty by signing the agreement, but
they only become domestically liable through ratification, which communicates a
state's commitment to provide for, and protect those rights within their own legal
system.").
96. See id. For a discussion of the RUDs, see Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 103d Cong. 5-15 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Hearing] (statement of
Jamison S. Borek, Deputy Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State) (detailing the legal
effects of the Clinton RUDs).
97. See Benshoof, supra note 6, at 4 ('"The Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations in 1994 and again in 2002 appended some eleven 'reservations,
understandings and declarations' (RUDs) to the original clean CEDAW signed by
President Carter in 1980.").
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law.98  Sovereignty has long been the banner under which
objections to human rights treaties have ridden.99 It has been said
that the proposed RUDs "substitutef a narrow definition which
would preclude women from using CEDAW to challenge laws,"1 00
indicating that they are designed to make CEDAW less
objectionable in the United States. 10 1
Specifically, the RUDs address several areas of concern. The
first reservation explicitly gives existing U.S. law priority over
CEDAW in that it proposes that the "Constitution and laws of the
United States establish extensive protections against
discrimination .... However, individual privacy and freedom
from governmental interference in private conduct are also
recognized as among the fundamental values of our free and
democratic society." 10 2  Therefore, the proposed reservation
specifies that "[tlhe United States does not accept any obligation
under the Convention to enact legislation or to take any other
action with respect to private conduct except as mandated by the
constitution and laws of the United States."103  In response to
Article 7(b) of CEDAW, regarding performance of public functions,
98. These reservations reflect a common fear "that the Convention infringes
upon the sovereignty of the United States and seeks to implement a radical agenda
that would undermine 'traditional' moral and social values, including marriage,
motherhood, family structure, and even Mother's Day." United Nations Association
of the United States of America, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, http://www.unausa.org/CEDAW (last visited Oct.
12, 2009). The United States generally attaches RUDs to human rights treaties
that make clear the nation's refusal to be bound by treaty terms that are
inconsistent with domestic law, or terms that provide either more or less protection
than domestic law. See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights
Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 341 (observing
that the United States attaches RUDs based on the principles that "[tlhe United
States will not undertake any treaty obligation that it will not be able to carry out
because it is inconsistent with the United States Constitution .... [Additionally,]
adherence to an international human rights treaty should not effect-or promise-
change in existing U.S. law or practice.").
99. See Minor, supra note 5, at 142 n.43 ("A state sacrifices a degree of
autonomy by ratifying any international agreement. However, human rights
treaties do not offer a commercial advantage to states that would make this
sacrifice worthwhile." (paraphrasing Cook, supra note 8, at 650)); see also PATRICK
NERHOT, LAW, WRITING, MEANING: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL HERMENEUTICS 30 (Ian
Fraser trans., 1992) ("Justice ... starts to operate as a power external to the
parties at dispute, and to belong to the sovereign.").
100. Benshoof, supra note 6, at 4.
101. For an outline of the U.S. position, see 1994 Hearing, supra note 96, at 5-
14. For a full discussion of the relative merits of the reservation process itself, see
Edward T. Swaine, Reserving, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 307 (2006). Again, it is worth
noting that the Optional Protocol to CEDAW permits no reservations. See Optional
Protocol, supra note 74, art. 17.
102. 1994 Hearing, supra note 96, at 9.
103. Id.
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the proposed reservation specifies that "the United States does not
accept an obligation under the Convention to assign women to all
military units and positions which may require engagement in
direct combat."10 4
Article 11 of CEDAW addresses economic equality. 0 5 The
United States has proposed a reservation to that article which
states that because equal pay for equal work is already protected
by U.S. law, "the United States does not accept any obligation
under this Convention to enact legislation establishing the
doctrine of comparable worth as that term is understood in U.S.
practice." 10 6 A similar reservation is proposed to that section of
Article 11 that addresses maternity leave, to the effect that "the
United States does not accept an obligation under article 11(2)(b)
to introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social
benefits without loss of former employment, seniority or social
allowances."107
In response to Articles 1 through 30 of CEDAW, the U.S.
government articulated its understanding that it would ensure
fulfillment of obligations under the treaty to the extent within its
jurisdiction,108 and that the United States would not be subject to
the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.10 9  In
response to Articles 5, 7, 8, and 13, there is an understanding that
freedoms of speech, expression, and association are already
protected in the United States, so no further action need be taken
under CEDAW.110 In response to Article 12, there is an
understanding that the United States will not allow CEDAW to
dictate when or how free health-care services are to be provided in
relation to "family planning, pregnancy, confinement and the post-
natal period." '
In what has been called "the most deceptive RUD, unopposed
by CEDAW supporters,"112 the United States addresses the
104. Id. at 10.
105. See CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 11.
106. 1994 Hearing, supra note 96, at 10.
107. Id. at 11.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 13.
110. Id. at 12.
111. Id.
112. Benshoof, supra note 6, at 4. This reservation is referred to as "deceptive"
because of its inclusion of the term "as a method of family planning," which is how
virtually all abortions are characterized in the United States. Id. Why CEDAW
supporters in the Senate have not objected to the inclusion of this term is a




possibility that CEDAW might at some point be used as the basis
for a right to abortion. However, "[n]othing in the
Convention ... requires states parties to guarantee access to
abortion. This Convention is 'abortion neutral."'1 13
The RUDs, particularly the one that addresses women's
reproductive freedom, have been characterized as "gutting"
CEDAW to make it more palatable to the U.S. Senate, where even
CEDAW's supporters have accepted the RUDs.114 The argument is
that in their efforts to move CEDAW forward, the U.S. Senate and
executive branch proposed RUDs that effectively leave the U.S.
government in complete control of how the treaty is interpreted
and implemented in this country if it is ever ratified. Whether
motivated by concerns about sovereignty or about political
expediency, it is difficult to see these RUDs as doing anything but
weakening CEDAW's impact if and when it is ever ratified in the
United States.
The U.S. Constitution is unambiguous in stating that treaties
are the supreme law of the land. 115 In the United States, no one
branch of government alone has the power to enter into treaties.1 16
Enabling legislation is the only clear indication that both the
executive and the legislative branches agree that the United
States will be bound by treaty obligations.11 7 Without enabling (or
implementing) legislation, the "treaty" is nothing more than an
indication by one branch of the government (the executive) that
the United States intends to be bound by the document's
provisions. There is no enforceable agreement without signature
by the President, advice and consent by the Senate, and, in the
113. 1994 Hearing, supra note 96, at 13.
114. Benshoof, supra note 6, at 4. ("Most supporters of ratification of CEDAW,
including [then] Vice President Elect Joe Biden, state that ratification of CEDAW
would not impose any new burden on the government. This is only true because
these Democrats are supporting the seriously politically compromised gutted
CEDAW; which if ratified is a step backward in developing equality law, not
forward." (internal footnote omitted)).
115. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
116. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829), overruled in part on other
grounds by United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1833) ("Our constitution
declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in
courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of
itself without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the
stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a
particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial
department; and the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a
rule for the Court.").
117. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 111(3)
(1987); VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANsIUs, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL
DISPUTES IN THE UNITED STATES § 10:9 (2d ed. 2009).
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case of a non-self-executing treatyl18 such as CEDAW, enabling
legislation.
In 2002, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee met and
reported on the ratification of CEDAW.119 Then-Senator Joseph
Biden chaired the committee and, after recounting the many
delays in moving forward with CEDAW, pointed out that "[t]ime is
a-wasting."120  Senator Biden reiterated proponents' usual
assurances that CEDAW would "impose a minimal burden" on the
United States because "[tihe U.S. Constitution and existing
Federal laws will satisfy the obligations of the treaty."'121 Senator
Barbara Boxer, to whom Senator Biden relinquished control of the
hearing in deference to her expertise on the treaty, agreed with
Senator Biden that "the ratification would not require the United
States to change or adopt any laws."'122 However, the ensuing
remarks, both in favor of and in opposition to ratification of
CEDAW, reveal the likelihood that no one can predict with any
certainty how CEDAW would actually be interpreted, applied, or
enforced in the United States. For example, there still seems to be
an ongoing debate over whether ratification would mean the end of
Mother's Day as discriminatory. 123
However, even if the Senate were to somehow reach
consensus on the treaty and grant its consent, CEDAW would only
become effective in the United States upon passage of enabling
legislation. 124 It is the enabling legislation, rather than CEDAW,
118. See infra notes 143-148 and accompanying text for a discussion of non-self-
executing treaties.
119. 2002 Hearing, supra note 7, at 1.
120. Id. at 3 (statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.). Note that a full seven
years have passed since Senator Biden made this statement. Time continues to be
"a-wasting."
121. Id. Senator Biden further said. "[t]he United States will need to enter a
handful of reservations to a treaty where it is inconsistent with our Constitution or
current Federal law, as we do with nearly every treaty, but the United States will
not need to enact any new laws to be in compliance with this treaty." Id. at 3-4. It
is not clear whether Senator Biden was aware that reservations had already been
proposed by President Clinton.
122. Id. at 7 (statement of Sen. Barbara Boxer).
123. See id. at 12-13. Mother's Day may not be as relevant as reproductive
rights, but the threat of outlawing it was undoubtedly designed to appeal to
Americans' traditional values. Even Senator Boxer, perhaps the Senate's strongest
advocate for ratification of CEDAW, found it necessary to say, on the record, "as a
mother and a grandmother and a United States Senator from the largest state, I
love Mother's Day, and this committee is not going to change my view on that ....
Id. at 13. With women's equality on the line, it seems somewhat alarming that the
Foreign Relations Committee found it appropriate to discuss the merits of Mother's
Day.
124. See Minor, supra note 5, at 142.
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that would confer upon individual citizens the right to enforce the
treaty's terms in the United States. 125  Given the historical
reluctance on the part of the Senate to even grant consent to
ratification of human rights treaties, compounded by its failure to
enact subsequent enabling legislation, it seems safe to say that
CEDAW is not likely to become a part of U.S. law any time soon. 126
It seems clear that the United States, despite having moved
forward in so many ways, is reluctant to proceed with CEDAW.127
Several reasons may underlie this reluctance, or hesitance, to
move forward in step with most other nations in the world on this
treaty. It may be sovereignty or it may be the agenda of those
who, like the late Senator Helms, see this treaty as capable of
forcing unacceptable changes onto the United States.128  The
reasons for the reluctance, however, may be less important than
the effect of it. It seems safe to say that until the United States
internalizes the anti-discrimination norms exemplified in CEDAW,
any attempts at ratification are misguided.
Some scholars have suggested ways that CEDAW might be
used to improve women's positions, both domestically and
internationally. 29  Certainly it has provided a progressive
framework for constitutional protections for women's rights to
equality in those countries that have incorporated CEDAW's
125. Id. This issue is relevant because even with the Optional Protocol,
individual citizens are not authorized by CEDAW to file domestic lawsuits based on
alleged discrimination. Cf. supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
126. It is worth noting along these lines that the United States proved utterly
incapable of amending the Constitution to contain an Equal Rights Amendment for
women. The Equal Rights Amendment, http://www.equalrightsamendment.org/
(last visited Nov. 30, 2009).
127. Minor, supra note 5, at 137.
128. See supra note 81-86 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Lisa A. Crooms, Families, Fatherlessness, and Women's Human
Rights: An Analysis of the Clinton Administration's Public Housing Policy as a
Violation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 1, 5 (1997-98) (proposing that public
housing benefits for poor people in the United States have created a phenomenon of
fatherlessness that would be in violation of CEDAW should the United States ever
ratify the treaty); see also Vedna Jivan & Christine Forster, What Would Gandhi
Say? Reconciling Universalism, Cultural Relativism and Feminism Through
Women's Use of CEDAW, 9 SING. Y.B. INT'L L. 103, 123 (2005) ("[Women's use of
domestic litigation strategies, enhanced by the use of CEDAW and both facilitated
and supported by the women's movement and N.G.Os, has a crucial role to play in
removing the cultural practices that discriminate against women."); O'Connell &
Sharma, supra note 62, at 22 (explaining how "CEDAW has made a tangible impact
on women's lives in countries where it has been ratified" and listing Turkey,
Tanzania, Colombia, and India as examples of states parties in which CEDAW has
been utilized to improve women's lives).
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objects and purposes into their constitutions. 130 But how domestic
courts may utilize international agreements represents "the classic
problem of effective human rights treaty implementation." 13'
It is by no means clear that ratification of CEDAW would
immediately or automatically produce a change in circumstances
for women in the United States. Look, for example, at the basic
need for childcare: working mothers throughout the United States
need safe, affordable childcare. 32 Nothing in U.S. law or the
Constitution recognizes this need; there is no right to childcare in
this country.13 3 Now, assume that the current administration
makes CEDAW a priority, obtaining the advice and consent of the
Senate, and introducing implementing legislation. It is almost
impossible to envision that enabling or implementing legislation.
If, at best, it directs domestic courts to honor the United States'
international obligations under CEDAW (as President George W.
Bush declared in an executive memorandum regarding the
International Court of Justice's jurisdiction in relation to the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations), 34 U.S. women might
petition domestic courts to recognize a right to childcare. 135 It is
not clear, however, where U.S. courts could look for guidance in
fashioning such a right. There is nothing in our legal or social
culture to serve as precedent. Indeed, our Constitution is
generally one of negative rather than positive rights. 136 A negative
130. Jivan & Forster, supra note 129, at 109-10.
131. Id. at 103.
132. For an excellent discussion of the struggle for childcare in this country, see
Martha F. Davis & Roslyn Powell, The International Convention on the Rights of
the Child: A Catalyst for Innovative Childcare Policies, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 689, 690
(2003), pointing out at the outset that "despite long years of attention to this issue,
efforts to identify a legal source for a broad right to childcare have been largely
unsuccessful-or at least, have lacked momentum."
133. Id. at 705.
134. See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1355-56 (2008) ("[N]ot all
international law obligations automatically constitute binding federal law
enforceable in United States courts.").
135. CEDAW does not specifically guarantee childcare, but its guarantees of
equal rights in the areas of employment and education would certainly lend
themselves to interpretation as grounds for arguing that a right to childcare is
implicit within CEDAW. See CEDAW, supra note 1, arts. 10-11.
136. For example, pursuant to the U.S. Constitution, citizens are guaranteed the
right to be free from warrantless searches of their homes. See U.S. CONST. amend
IV. The guarantee is expressed in terms of what the government may not do,
rather than in terms of what the government must do. See id. CEDAW itself may
be framed in terms of positive rights, such as the article protecting women's right
to reproductive freedom, but the United States' RUDs are framed in negative
terms, specifically, "[n]othing in the Convention ... requires states parties to
guarantee access to abortion." 1994 Hearing, supra note 96, at 13. Perhaps the
United States, because of its constitutional framework, is uncomfortable with the
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right in this context might be one that would "require government
to abstain from denigrating (rather than requiring governments to
intervene on behalf of) human dignity."137  From the U.S.
Constitution to modern labor laws, our system is designed to
require that government not act, rather than that it act. 138 The
United States lacks a framework for finding and enforcing an
affirmative right to childcare. Ratification of CEDAW is not likely
to change these structural characteristics of our system.
Similarly, if CEDAW is ratified with the current RUDs,
women's reproductive rights would clearly be unchanged in the
United States. The RUDs specifically ensure that nothing in the
treaty may be construed to provide any right to an abortion. 139
Reproductive rights remain an issue for women in the United
States, even more than thirty-five years after Roe v. Wade. 40
Ratification of CEDAW with the existing RUDs would do nothing
to change that situation. Conversely, ratification and full
implementation of CEDAW, absent the current RUDs, "would
require a wholesale shift in abortion jurisprudence from privacy
analysis to an equality analysis and the resulting increased
scrutiny of restrictions on access to abortion through an equality
lens."'4 1 The treaty has not moved toward ratification, even with
the RUDs in place to weaken (if not "gut") its impact. Ratification
of CEDAW without the RUDs does not appear to be within the
realm of possibility and is only being suggested by a very few
scholars. 142
To further complicate any meaningful progress on CEDAW,
human rights treaties have long been considered to be non-self-
positive rights framework of CEDAW. For an excellent discussion of how
constitutions might be framed in positive terms, see Vijayashri Sripati,
Constitutionalism in India and South Africa: A Comparative Study from a Human
Rights Perspective, 16 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 49 (2007).
137. Beth Simmons, Civil Rights in International Law: Compliance with Aspects
of the "International Bill of Rights," 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 437, 440
(2009).
138. See generally the works of John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and John Rawls
for in-depth discussion of the origins and relative merits of positive versus negative
rights. See also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986) (discussing theories of
legal rights).
139. See 2002 Hearing, supra note 7, at 25 (statement of Rep. Carolyn B.
Maloney) ('The CEDAW treaty has been certified as abortion-neutral by the State
Department; Senator Helms led the way in making this explicit back in 1994,
adding a formal understanding to the treaty that notes it does not guarantee any
right to abortion.").
140. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
141. Benshoof, supra note 6, at 3.
142. See, e.g., id. ("[T]his paper focuses on the impact and importance of
implementation of a clean, reservation-free CEDAW ....").
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executing. 143  CEDAW in particular must be viewed in this
manner because nothing in the terms of the treaty itself provides
otherwise. "'Courts in the United States are bound to give effect
to... international agreements of the United States' unless the
agreement is non-self-executing."' 144 Thus, there is every reason to
believe that implementing or enabling legislation will be needed
before CEDAW could have any effect, even if it is ratified by the
United States.
Implementing legislation was at the heart of a recent
Supreme Court decision, Medellin v. Texas.145 Leading up to
Medellin, the International Court of Justice decided that the
United States violated the rights of Mexican nationals by failing to
inform them of their rights under the Vienna Convention. 46 Chief
Justice John Roberts, at least, made it clear that he views with
suspicion any treaty that purports to be self-executing (and
probably most that do not). 47 Writing for the majority, the Chief
Justice reiterated that even though treaties "may comprise
international commitments ... they are not domestic law unless
143. See Henkin, supra note 98, at 346 ('The United States has been declaring
the human rights agreements it has ratified to be non-self-executing."); see also
KAUFMAN, supra note 79, at 114 ("[S]elf-executing treaties need no implementing
legislation to be effective and can be cited and applied by domestic courts.").
Human rights treaties have never been so treated by U.S. courts. See Minor, supra
note 5, at 142 (stating that courts have "almost uniformly" held "that human rights
clauses are non-self-executing").
144. Ku, supra note 16, at 613 (quoting the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 111(3) (1987)). Conversely, then, courts are not
bound to give effect to treaties that are non-self-executing unless implementing
legislation has been enacted.
145. 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
146. Id. at 1352. The Vienna Convention right in question was Medellin's right
to contact the Mexican consulate to inform it of his detention after he was arrested
for murdering a girl in Texas. Id. at 1354.
147. Id. at 1358. At his confirmation hearings, Justice Roberts said "looking at
foreign law for support [of an interpretation of the U.S. Constitution] is like looking
out over a crowd and picking out your friends. You can find them, they're
there.... I think that's a misuse of precedent, not a correct use of precedent."
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
201 (2005)). Justice Alito, at his confirmation hearings, stated:
I don't think that it's appropriate or useful to look to foreign law in
interpreting the provisions of our Constitution. I think the Framers would
be stunned by the idea that the Bill of Rights is to be interpreted by taking
a poll of the countries of the world .... The Framers did not want
Americans to have the rights of people in... Europe .... They wanted
them to have the rights of Americans ....
Confirmation Hearings on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 471 (2006). These are not the statements of Justices
who will look favorably on enforcing international law.
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Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty
itself conveys an intention that it be 'self-executing' and is ratified
on these terms."'148
CEDAW's terms indicate that it is not self-executing,' 49 so
any analysis must assume that, like other human rights treaties,
it is not. Medellin supports the notion that it takes a very clear
statement of intent before a treaty will be considered self-
executing, and that enabling or implementing legislation will be
required before any U.S. court will consider CEDAW enforceable
in this country. 50 But again, it is almost impossible to imagine
what any implementing legislation might look like regarding
CEDAW, especially given all of its current RUDs.' 5 ' All of these
concerns make it difficult to predict what a domestic court might
be able to do to enforce the terms of the treaty, and thus difficult
to predict what benefit the treaty might actually confer on women
in the United States.
III. Is CEDAW Necessary or Desirable?
Because international law does not lend itself easily to
enforcement, it is not always possible to determine whether, let
alone why, states abide by it. Adherence to international law can
be defined as "behavior as to which there is--on the part of the
actor, the victim, and others-a sense of obligation, and a sense of
violation when it fails."' 52 Note, however, that "[]aw is not an end
in itself: even in the most enlightened domestic society it is a
means-to order, stability, liberty, security, justice, welfare."'15 3
Passage of CEDAW should be seen not as the end, but as a means
toward internalization of the its goal of elimination of all forms of
discrimination against women.154 Without internalization of these
norms, ratification will be hollow at best and, at worst, will enable
the United States to sit back and maintain the discriminatory
status quo.155 "In international society ... law observance will
148. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1356 (omission in original) (quoting Igartua-De La
Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005)).
149. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 2(o.
150. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1356.
151. See supra notes 102-114 and accompanying text.
152. HENKIN, supra note 14, at 14 n.*.
153. Id. at 90.
154. See supra note 44 for CEDAW's full definition of discrimination.
155. See Hathaway, supra note 17, at 1989, stating:
[N]ot only is treaty ratification not associated with better human rights
practices than otherwise expected, but it is often associated with worse
practices. Countries that ratify human rights treaties often appear less
likely, rather than more likely, to conform to the requirements of the
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depend more closely on the law's current acceptability and on the
community's-especially the victim's--current interest in
vindicating it."156
Human rights treaties are different from other treaties in
that the subject of the treaty is an individual rather than a
state. 157 However, while there may not be benefits to the state in
terms of money or power,158 compliance with human rights treaties
does increase a state's stature in the international community; its
reputation, if you will.15 9 A state's compliance with a human
rights treaty "occurs due to state concern about both reputational
and direct sanctions triggered by violations of the law."' 60 There
are, then, some reasons why the United States, and especially
President Obama,161 might want to pursue ratification of CEDAW.
Even if any effect of ratification is more symbolic than practical,
the value of "bragging rights" should not be underestimated. It is
less clear, however, that ratification on these terms would be a
good thing, especially in light of empirical research that raises
serious questions about whether ratification of human rights
treaties raises or lowers a country's actual performance in relation
to human rights. 162
In her seminal work, Professor Oona Hathaway asked
treaties than countries that do not ratify these treaties.
Id.
156. HENKIN, supra note 14, at 93.
157. See HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 201 (2000); see also Oona A. Hathaway,
Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?, 51 J. OF CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 588, 592 (2007) (explaining that while in the past, international law
scholars believed that states entered into treaties solely for their own benefit,
recent theories have turned to other explanations, particularly in regard to human
rights).
158. See Hathaway, supra note 17, at 1938.
159. See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law,
90 CAL. L. REV. 1825, 1827 (2002). Professor Guzman proposes several theories
about why countries comply with treaties, and discusses "reputational sanctions" as
depending on the nature and severity of the non-compliance, explaining the
"possibility that states will suffer a reputational loss when they violate implicit
obligations...." Id. at 1861.
160. Id. at 1827.
161. President Obama is the first African American to be elected president of the
United States, and his family background includes Christians and Muslims, blacks
and whites. See Organizing for America, Know the Facts,
http://www.barackobama.com/factcheck/2007/11/12/obama-hasnever_been_a musl
im_1.php#practicing-christian (last visited Oct. 13, 2009). Discrimination is surely
a subject with which he is all too familiar, and he may be highly motivated to take
the United States off the list of countries like Iran, Sudan, and Somalia that have
also failed to ratify CEDAW. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
162. See Hathaway, supra note 17.
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whether countries actually comply with the requirements of
human rights treaties they join. 163 The answer, too often, is no. 164
Not only does entry into human rights treaties not improve a
state's behavior, there is some evidence that doing so decreases,
rather than increases, an entering state's human rights
performance.165 One explanation for this troubling result is that it
is relatively easy and risk-free for countries to join human rights
treaties and then to simply ignore them.166 They reap the benefits
of being able to profess allegiance to high human rights standards
(thus exercising their bragging rights), and enhance their
reputations in the international community. However, both
monitoring and enforcement of human rights treaties are
notoriously weak, so there may be no negative consequences for
those countries whose participation in such treaties is nominal, at
best.167
For U.S. women, Professor Hathaway's research may indicate
that ratification of CEDAW could do more harm than good. If the
163. Id. at 1938. Many scholars have cited Professor Hathaway, yet it seems
that no one has attempted to duplicate her research. It remains the most
significant piece of empirical research in this field.
164. Id. at 1940.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1942. In a subsequent piece, Professor Hathaway analyzed why
countries join human rights treaties from the perspective of cost. See Oona
Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1821 (2003). In that piece,
Professor Hathaway proposed that the cost of commitment may be seen from one of
three perspectives. First, every nation pays a price in terms of its own sovereignty
when it joins a human rights treaty, because joining the treaty requires the state to
"surrender power to inspect the relationship between the state and its citizens." Id.
at 1826. Second, countries may join human rights treaties for the "genuine
commitment to the ideas such treaties embody." Id. Third, and perhaps most
importantly for the United States' purposes, "the cost of commitment varies
according to the degree to which countries' [human rights] ratings diverge from the
treaties' requirements .... [A]Ill things being equal, the further their practices
diverge from the requirements of the treaty, the less likely countries will be to
join." Id. Whichever theory is employed to understand why countries join human
rights treaties, Professor Hathaway is clear that "the internal enforcement process
is an important factor that should not be overlooked." Id. at 1834. In a democratic
nation such as the United States, the tools of domestic enforcement may be much
more readily available than in a non-democratic country, which would raise both
the cost and the benefits of commitment to a treaty such as CEDAW.
167. Hathaway, supra note 17, at 2020 ("[B]ecause human rights treaties are
generally only minimally monitored and enforced, there is little incentive for
ratifying countries to make the costly changes in actual policy that would be
necessary to meet their treaty commitments."). For example, Afghanistan,
Colombia, and Mexico are cited as having particularly poor human rights records
despite having ratified the Convention Against Torture. See Hathaway, supra note
166, at 1822. For a specific critique of the flaws in CEDAW, see Minor, supra note
5, at 137. CEDAW's reservation procedure is analyzed in Cook, supra note 8, at
643.
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United States ratifies CEDAW in name but not intent, for
symbolic purposes only, any current discussion about
discrimination against women in the United States will most
likely end abruptly.' 68 The United States would not need to do
anything more 169  than submit periodic reports 170  to the
Committee,"" and would have no motivation to even talk about
ending discrimination. Supporters of CEDAW in the United
States like to point out that its ratification would require no
changes to existing U.S. law because the Constitution and federal
laws already protect women from discrimination. 72 If so, then
post-ratification compliance by the United States would require
nothing more than periodic reports to the Committee, of which the
United States could become a member upon ratification. 173
Nothing would change: no new laws, no new basis for litigation, no
policy reform. The only logical effect of symbolic ratification for
women in the United States would be that there would no longer
be a reason for the country as a whole to engage in any
168. That there is a current dialogue is reflected by the number of articles
written on the subject of the United States' failure to ratify CEDAW (many of
which are cited herein) if not by any action on the part of our government. See, e.g.,
Benshoof, supra note 6 (analyzing the United States' reservations to CEDAW in
light of family planning).
169. Opponents of CEDAW warn of domestic litigation to enforce it, but
regarding the reluctance of United States courts to enforce treaties, see Minor,
supra note 5, at 141-43. "Human rights treaties have historically enjoyed little
success in the United States, in part because American courts have not interpreted
their provisions liberally." Id. at 141; cf. HEVENER, supra note 30 (noting many
international treaties that include provisions for women's rights focus on changing
the conceptualization of women's roles, as opposed to changing currently
implemented law).
170. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 18 (requiring reports from states parties at the
conclusion of their first year as members of CEDAW, and every four years
thereafter).
171. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
172. See American Association of University Women, Treaty for the Rights of
Women (CEDAW) Resource Kit, www.aauw.org/About/internationalcorner/
CEDAW-Resource-Kit.cfm (last visited Sept. 20, 2009) (describing the United
States' involvement with the development of CEDAW and encouraging
ratification). The argument is designed to make CEDAW appear more palatable to
its opponents: the United States is portrayed as already protecting women from
discrimination, so ratification of CEDAW would be symbolic but harmless.
Interestingly, opponents use similar reasoning when they argue that the
Constitution already provides all of the protection U.S. women might need, so
ratification of CEDAW is unnecessary. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
This issue may be the one area where opponents and proponents agree.
173. CEDAW, supra note 1, arts. 17-18; see also United Nations Association of
the United States of America, Myths and Realities About CEDAW,
www.unausa.org/Page.aspx?pid=935 (last visited Oct. 12, 2009) (noting that
ratification of CEDAW would not "impose a radical feminist agenda upon the
United States.").
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conversation about the fact that women in the United States
continue to experience discrimination on the basis of sex.
Ratifying CEDAW could amount to sweeping the problem under
the carpet, which generally does more harm than good.
States comply with treaty obligations for several reasons.
Compliance with treaty obligations has been explained by
reference to "efficiency, interests, and norms,"1 74 meaning that
states comply with treaties when it is efficient to do so, when it is
in their interests to do so, and when they have internalized the
treaty's norms so that compliance requires no change in
behavior. 175 In the case of human rights treaties, only norms can
prompt meaningful compliance because there is no state interest,
as there might be with, for example, a trade agreement. 176 The
United States appears unready to embrace the norms reflected in
CEDAW.177 Ratification "to appease a domestic or international
constituency, with little intention of carrying [the treaty] out"178
would be meaningless at best.
The United States has declined to move toward ratifying
CEDAW for nearly a decade. 179 This failure to ratify indicates that
perhaps the United States does not see a need to endorse
CEDAW's goal of eliminating discrimination against women.
Until CEDAW's goals gain widespread acceptance by, and become
a priority for, the U.S. community, ratification would be nothing
more than legalism: law for law's sake, rather than law as a
means toward the end of discrimination against women.
Could CEDAW shape U.S. behavior for the better? Again,
Professor Hathaway has studied the extent to which "international
law shapes state behavior beyond simple decisions to ratify."180
174. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 91, at 4.
175. Id. at 4-8.
176. The United States, for example, would protect no economic interest by
ratifying CEDAW. Where there is no money to be made or lost, the level of
attention paid to treaty compliance undoubtedly decreases. See supra notes 92-93
and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text, discussing the United
States' proposed RUD pertaining to abortion.
178. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 91, at 9.
179. The last activity occurred with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Hearing on July 30, 2002, and the movement towards ratification has been stalled
with the Committee since that time. See Amnesty International USA, Support
Treaty for the Rights of Women (CEDAW), http://www.amnestyusa.org/women/
cedaw/history.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
180. Hathaway, supra note 157, at 589. Professor Hathaway's extensive
empirical research addresses three specific human rights treaties: the Convention
Against Torture, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and
CEDAW, and is not limited to those treaties' treatment by the United States. Id. at
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Professor Hathaway's research shows that "whether states will
commit to a treaty depends in significant part on whether they
expect to comply with it once they join."181 She concludes that the
notion of human rights treaties as "cheap talk with virtually no
impact on state practice ... ignores" the possible effectiveness of
domestic rather than international enforcement of the human
rights treaty's obligations.18 2 Professor Hathaway does observe
that "[w]here powerful actors can hold the government to account,
international legal commitments are more meaningful. Where
there are no such constraints, even formally binding treaties may
be ignored with relative impunity."'8 3 Ultimately, she concludes
that "all other things held equal, the more likely a country is to
change its human rights behavior as a consequence of committing
to a treaty, the less likely it will be to ratify the treaty in the first
place." 8 4 That is, her research indicates that countries wait to
ratify human rights treaties until they are committed to complying
with those treaties. 8 5
This research might explain the United States' reluctance to
ratify CEDAW. It may not be that the country is not ready to
embrace CEDAW's norms, it may simply be that the United States
recognizes that ratification would require changing its behavior
and it is not yet ready to make that commitment. 8 6 Regardless of
whether changed behavior must precede or follow ratification, the
United States is apparently not ready to do either.
Professor Hathaway's later findings indicate that ratification
of human rights treaties may have a positive impact on states'
human rights records: treaties tend to be complied with once
ratified. 8 7 Therefore, it is also possible that an argument in
591.
181. Id. at 590.
182. Id. at 593.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 594.
185. See id. at 590 ("[Tlhe anticipated positive and negative effects of
international laws on states deeply influence the choice of states to accept
international legal commitments in the first place. Because international treaties
are not binding on states unless they choose to be bound, the effects of treaties
depend on who agrees to be bound. And who agrees to be bound, in turn, depends
on the treaties' likely effects.").
186. Note that Hathaway refers to "commitment" to the treaty as separate from
"simple ratification." See id. Note also that, as referenced earlier, one argument
made by supporters of U.S. ratification is that no new laws would need to be
enacted to bring the United States into compliance with CEDAW. This argument
indicates an unwillingness to acknowledge that change may, in fact, be required
under this treaty. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
187. Hathaway, supra note 17, at 2011 ("[L]arge numbers of countries do
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opposition to U.S. ratification of CEDAW is recognition that
ratification would, or should, affect the nation's behavior. 88 But
again, if this is the reason, it is not articulated in the arguments of
CEDAW opponents (or supporters) who claim that CEDAW is
unnecessary because the U.S. Constitution already provides all of
the protections women need against discrimination.1 89 In fact,
Professor Hathaway's findings seem to refute this argument
against U.S. ratification of CEDAW.190 The logic of such an
argument in opposition to ratification seems circular, at best. It
makes no sense that both supporters and opponents of U.S.
ratification of CEDAW argue that no action is required to bring
the United States into compliance with the treaty's requirements.
Commitment to CEDAW ought to alter U.S. policy, law, and
behavior towards women, and until the United States is prepared
to make those changes, ratification would be hollow and harmful;
it would not be a benign gesture. Thus, the logical argument in
opposition to CEDAW is not that it is unnecessary, but that, as
Professor Hathaway observes, it will require changes in the
United States-changes the country is apparently not yet ready to
make.
Professor Hathaway's research and conclusions lead to the
inquiry of which comes first, ratification or state behavior that
reflects compliance with the treaties that have been ratified.' 91
Her findings "suggest that not only is treaty ratification not
associated with better human rights practices than otherwise
actually comply with the terms of the human rights treaties they ratify .... ").
188. See supra notes 169-173 and accompanying text.
189. The Heritage Foundation, for example, takes the position that "American
women are free, legally and culturally, to pursue opportunities and relationships of
their choosing. Americans should continue to fight incidental discrimination, while
preserving the security afforded by the U.S. system of rights enshrined in the U.S.
Constitution and protected under federal and state laws." Grace Melton, CEDAW:
How U.N. Interference Threatens the Rights of American Women, HERITAGE
FOUND., Jan. 9, 2009, www.heritage.org/Research/Familybg2227.cfm.
190. See supra notes 163-178 and accompanying text. If the United States was
already in compliance, it would have internalized the treaty's norms and would
have no reason to resist ratification. Professor Hathaway's research does not
indicate that countries resist ratification based on their compliance, but that
countries resist ratification because they are aware that they are not in compliance;
therefore, change would be required in order to bring resistant countries into
compliance. See Hathaway, supra note 157, at 594 ("Mhe more likely a country is
to change its human rights behavior as a consequence of committing to a treaty, the
less likely it will be to ratify the treaty in the first place.").
191. See Hathaway, supra note 17, at 1989 (describing the relationship between
ratification and human rights practices as interesting, but inconclusive as to
causation); see also id. at 1992 ("[M]ultivariate quantitative analysis, no matter
how carefully done, is a useful but imperfect tool for examining complex questions
of human action.").
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expected, but it is often associated with worse practices." 192 Her
findings do not, however, reveal why this is so. She states that the
data "cannot tell us whether the patterns that we observe are due
to the impact of treaties or instead to factors that are associated
both with ratification and with countries' human rights ratings."193
Ultimately, the United States is right to refrain from ratifying a
treaty with which it is unable or unwilling to comply, a practice
perhaps engaged in more frequently by countries that have poor
records of abiding by laws in general. 94 "[R]atification of treaties
can serve to offset pressure for real change in practices.' 195 This
argument is another way of saying that a hollow ratification of
CEDAW would stop the conversation about the ways in which
women in the United States are discriminated against, and about
the best way to end that discrimination. 1 96
Some commentators suggest that the United States would
help women everywhere if it took the step of ratifying CEDAW,
and that the United States should lead by example.197 However,
as Professor Hathaway notes, "the current treaty system may
create opportunities for countries to use treaty ratification to
displace pressure for real change in practices.' 198 There is a
general "pressure" on countries to ratify human rights treaties as
an expression of their "commitment to human rights norms."'199
Ratification of CEDAW could take the pressure off of the United
States, and it would then be less likely to "improve its practices"
than it otherwise might.200 Even if, over time, ratification of
CEDAW were to have a positive effect, "this process can take
decades to lead to tangible change. '201 U.S. ratification would
likely not only do little to hasten, but could even postpone, perhaps
indefinitely, any benefit from the treaty, and could prevent the
192. Id. at 1989.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 2013.
195. Id.
196. Hollow ratification would also be an unreasonable and unnecessary act of
deception and disingenuousness on the part of the United States.
197. See, e.g., 2002 Hearing, supra note 7, at 85 (statement of American Bar
Association) ("Senate action now will demonstrate to the world that, despite the
events of September 11 and their aftermath, this country remains committed to
human rights advancement, encouraging both the further development of emerging
democracies and the promise of democratic principles and participatory
government in countries where freedom is newly won.").
198. Hathaway, supra note 17, at 2022.
199. Id. at 2020.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 2022.
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United States from serving as a good example anywhere around
the world.202 If the United States is not yet ready to commit to the
goals of CEDAW it should not ratify the treaty; doing so without a
commitment to the treaty's purposes could do more harm than
good. Professor Hathaway's findings should caution the United
States against ratification of CEDAW with anything less than full
commitment to its objects and purposes.
An analogy can be drawn here to the theory of "legal
cooptation" that underlies critical legal scholarship in certain
domestic arenas. Legal cooptation occurs when a previously
marginalized group experiences apparent successes via legislation
or judicial decisions. Professor Orly Lobel defines legal cooptation
as "a process by which the focus on legal reform narrows the
causes, deradicalizes the agenda, legitimizes ongoing injustices,
and diverts energies away from more effective and transformative
alternatives."20 3 Examples of legal cooptation in the United States
arguably occurred with both the labor movement and the civil
rights movement.204 "In both periods, critics have understood
victories as limited and symbolic, deradicalizing and cooptating a
more comprehensive vision.'"205 On these terms, both the National
Labor Relations Act 20 6 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964207 are
viewed as "failed successes" that resulted in "the pacification of the
social movement and the decline of a reform vision."208 The theory
of legal cooptation concludes that social movements are harmed by
202. The notion of the United States as a world leader in the human rights
arena may well be outmoded in light of invasions and violence in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
203. Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal
Consciousness and Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 939 (2007).
Professor Lobel describes the effect further:
The law entices groups to choose legal strategies to advance their social
goals but ultimately proves to be a detrimental
path .... Consequently ... the turn to the law actually reinforces existing
institutions and ideologies. As they engage with the law, social reform
groups become absorbed by the system even as they struggle against it.
Id. Professor Lobel ultimately warns that extralegal cooptation carries the same
risks as legal cooptation and thus should be approached with caution by groups
seeking social movement and change. Id. at 942. Professor Lobel cites many
authorities for the origins of the theory of legal cooptation, among the most
interesting of which may be FRANCIS FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR
PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL (Vintage Books 1979)
(1977).
204. Lobel, supra note 203, at 942.
205. Id.
206. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2006).
207. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (2006).
208. Lobel, supra note 203, at 940.
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such failed successes and that "the limits of social change are not
confined to legal reform, but in fact are as likely (if not more so) to
occur in the realm of extralegal activism." 209 Therefore, the theory
is that truly progressive or transformative social progress is more
likely to occur without, rather than with, laws that purport to
require such change. 210
The detrimental effects of legislation on the labor and civil
rights movements are detailed by Professor Lobel, who concludes
that despite these failed successes, the legal system is a valid
arena for social change because, ultimately, "alternative extralegal
strategies are in fact vulnerable to the same types of
limitations" 211 as legal strategies. Those limitations include
draining the resources and energies of a social movement, limiting
and fragmenting the issues of the social movement, and concerns
regarding "lawyering and professionalism, crowding-out effects,
institutional limitations, and legitimation."212  Legal cooptation
may not be a ringing endorsement of either legal or extralegal
strategies for invoking social change.
The theory of legal cooptation supports a cautious approach
to U.S. ratification of CEDAW. Here, symbolic support of a treaty
whose norms have not yet been internalized could result in yet
another failed success, a hollow victory that stops far short of
addressing the real problem of ongoing discrimination against
women in this country. As has been pointed out in relation to civil
rights legislation and litigation, not all forms of discrimination
lend themselves to resolution by litigation:
One of the glaring failures of the civil rights movement was to
provide a mechanism for economic equality .... The civil
rights movement, historically, has always failed in that area
because it was always the most difficult. Whites didn't mind
giving up public accommodations or seats on the bus, but
209. Id.
210. See id. at 946-47 (noting that, after Brown v. Board of Education, 343 U.S.
483 (1954), and enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, "despite the enthusiasm
around legal reform, race theorists gradually began to challenge the apparent
success of judicial victories ... as well as legislative victories .... Civil rights
organizations were criticized for concentrating on issues that were more susceptible
to remedy by litigation, such as school segregation and workplace discrimination,
rather than attacking redistributive problems that were of greater importance to
the people they were supposedly serving."). Professor Lobel cites several excellent
sources for further discussion of whether the civil rights movement had a real,
rather than a symbolic, impact on racism in America. Lobel, supra note 203, at 947
nn.35-37.
211. Id. at 949.
212. Id.
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when it comes to money or jobs, they would not do it. 213
The same might be said of men and women in the United
States. The manner in which women are discriminated against
may not lend itself to a strictly legal solution because it is
widespread and pervasive, while legal solutions tend to be of
limited scope and narrow focus. 214 Ratifying CEDAW is not likely
to mean an end to the subtle and pervasive forms of discrimination
faced by women on a daily basis, such as wage disparity and the
lack of safe, affordable childcare for working mothers. Cooptation,
with its concomitant deradicalization and narrowed focus, 215 may
be the likely, and undesirable, result of ratification without
internalization of the treaty's goals. Cooptation, ultimately, could
end the conversation about discrimination against women in this
country.
Social scientists and legal scholars also refer to the theory of
resource mobilization in analyzing the progress (or lack thereof) of
social movements.216 Pursuant to this theory, social change only
213. Harold Norris, A Perspective on the History of Civil Rights Law in
Michigan, 1996 DETROIT C.L. MICH. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 567, 599 (omission in
original) (quoting Denise Chrittendon & Linda Jones, NAACP: 80 Years of
Challenge, DETROIT NEWS, July 7, 1989, at El). Caution towards legal cooptation,
however, does not mean that litigation is never a good approach to social problems.
Litigation is certainly preferable to mandatory alternative dispute resolution. See
Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075-76 (1984). Professor Fiss
points out:
By viewing the lawsuit as a quarrel between two neighbors, the dispute-
resolution story that underlies ADR implicitly asks us to assume a rough
equality between the contending parties.... Many lawsuits do not involve
a property dispute between two neighbors ... but rather concern a
struggle between a member of a racial minority and a municipal police
department over alleged brutality, or a claim by a worker against a large
corporation over work-related injuries. In these cases, the distribution of
financial resources, or the ability of one party to pass along its costs, will
invariably infect the bargaining process, and the settlement will be at odds
with a conception of justice that seeks to make the wealth of the parties
irrelevant.
Id. at 1076.
214. Cf. Lobel, supra note 203, at 952 (illustrating the narrowed focus that can
accompany legal strategies, Professor Lobel points out that "many today believe
that the focus of the labor movement's New Deal reordering sacrificed the interests
of women and minorities in the name of an united front supporting the enactment
of the [National Labor Relations Act], while others believe that the turn toward
narrow, identity-based rights-claiming since the 1960s has been detrimental to the
cause of broader workplace justice.").
215. See supra text accompanying notes 203-209.
216. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement
Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12 (2001) (describing the
"American approach" to social movement literature as that of "resource
mobilization'). Professor Rubin concludes:
Social movements literature emphasizes that the ideas and values we care
about most-equality, free speech, religious freedom, due process, the
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occurs when a group has more in common than a set of grievances
against a majority. 217 Minorities obtain and wield political power
over stronger majority groups when they are bound together by
common ideologies and are thus motivated to engage in resource
mobilization. 218 Under this theory, discrimination against women
will end, when it does, as a result of social change rather than of
legal reform.219 In this manner, even a relatively disenfranchised
minority can bring about social change in ways that are more
meaningful than the failed successes so frequently wrought by
strictly legal reforms. 220 In order to keep the conversation about
discrimination alive in the United States, it may be time to look at
women and their interests through a lens that captures more than
sex alone can explain.
IV. Has the Time for a Women's Treaty Passed?
That women in the United States continue to face
discrimination cannot be reasonably disputed. Rape, domestic
violence, and forced prostitution are some of the more horrific
abuses that thrive in the United States today,221 but there are
prohibition of slavery and torture-were fought for, bled for, and died for.
They are the glories of our current civilization, not because we possess the
pallid virtue of perceiving these principles as they float about in some sort
of transcendental nimbus, but because we possess the effulgent virtue of
maintaining and re-creating them amid the chaos and danger of ongoing
circumstances.
Id. at 83. For a full examination of resource mobilization theories, see THE
DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: RESOURCE MOBILIZATION, SOCIAL CONTROL,
AND TACTICS (Mayer N. Zald & John D. McCarthy eds., 1979).
217. See Stephen Loffredo, Poverty Law and Community Activism: Notes from a
Law School Clinic, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 198 (2001) ("Commentators have
applied resource mobilization theory to study the ways in which marginalized
groups assemble necessary resources to obtain political rights or social status.").
The question thus may be whether U.S. women in the twenty-first century have
enough in common to be considered a cohesive group. See infra notes 223-231 and
accompanying text.
218. Cf. Kathleen Valtonen, From the Margin to the Mainstream:
Conceptualizing Refugee Settlement Processes, 17 J. REFUGEE STUD. 70, 89 (2004)
(explaining how minority and majority groups alike can "mobilize social resources
to advocate, initiate and implement anti-oppressive policy," thereby accomplishing
their goals of ending the disfavored policy).
219. See Rubin, supra note 216, at 14 (explaining that social reforms are the true
impetus for change). Professor Rubin also explains that "[t]he crucial aspect of
social movements, therefore, is that they enable people to generate new ideologies
and re-define their own identities." Id. at 14; cf. Lobel, supra note 203, at 940
(arguing that social change often occurs "in the realm of extralegal activism" rather
than as a result of legal reform).
220. Cf. Valtonen, supra note 218, at 89 (describing how refugees who "possess
no political leverage initially ... work through community organizations" to
challenge societal norms).
221. See, for example, Jonathan Abel, Downfall of a Sex Slave Ring, ST.
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other pervasive abuses that are ongoing: from wages to housing to
childcare and health care, women face subordination on a daily
basis.222 While feminist jurisprudence suggests that the way to
address such subordination (or discrimination) is via a feminist
approach, 223 there may be reason to believe that many other
factors, such as race, socioeconomic status, age, citizenship, or
immigration status, contribute at least as much as sex to women's
subordination.224
It may thus be time to ask whether there is a commonality of
interests that justifies a treaty designed to end discrimination
against women. To identify women as a group on the basis of
sex 225 alone may be to ignore those things that social scientists
identify as forming the basis for group interests. "[O]rganizations
or associations exist to further the interests of their
members .... ,"226 Without something more than sex to connect
PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 15, 2009, at B1, available at 2009 WLNR 4989945,
detailing the plight of a Guatemalan woman who was smuggled into the United
States thinking she would work as a housekeeper, but who was instead forced into
prostitution by her smugglers. Nearly two months later, the same newspaper
reported that police were seeking more victims of a local sex slave ring, the
operators of which were accused of luring women to a private residence, holding
them against their will, and forcing them to work as prostitutes and exotic dancers.
Jamal Thalji, Sex Slavery Victims Sought, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 13, 2009, at
B1, available at 2009 WLNR 9105318.
222. See Crenshaw, supra note 2, at 1245-46 (stating that women who go to
shelters for battered women often have many other kinds of oppressive issues
affecting their lives that cannot be dealt with in isolation).
223. See, e.g., Clare Dalton, Where We Stand: Observations on the Situation of
Feminist Legal Thought, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 2 (1987-88) ("To be a
feminist today, I think it is fair to say, is to believe that we belong to a society, or
even civilization, in which women are and have been subordinated by and to men,
and that life would be better, certainly for women, possibly for everybody, if that
were not the case .... To be engaged in feminist legal thought is to be a feminist
who locates both her inquiry, and her activity, in relation to the legal system.").
See generally Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (1989-90) (providing a substantive overview of
feminist jurisprudence).
224. See Crenshaw, supra note 2, at 1242 (arguing that race and class, among
other factors, can be as important in group identity as gender).
225. The word "sex" is used to identify the physical characteristics of women as
opposed to men. The word "gender" connotes the social and cultural, rather than
the physical, characteristics. See Mari Mikkola, Feminist Perspectives on Sex and
Gender, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2008),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall200S/entries/feminism-gender/ ("Most people
ordinarily seem to think that sex and gender are coextensive: women are human
females, men are human males. Many feminists have historically disagreed and
have endorsed the sex/gender distinction. Provisionally: 'sex' denotes human
females and males depending on biological features (chromosomes, sex organs,
hormones and other physical features); 'gender' denotes women and men depending
on social factors (social role, position, behaviour or identity).").
226. MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
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them, women may not share the characteristics that Aristotle
recognized as being inherent in the formation of groups among
humans:
[P]eople make their way together on the basis that they will
get some advantage from it, and so as to provide themselves
with some necessity of life; and the political community too
seems both to have come together in the beginning and to
remain in place for the sake of advantage .... 227
In the current U.S. political and social cultures, it is possible that
age, race, and poverty have at least as much to do with logical
group formation as does sex.
Factors such as age, race, socioeconomic status, immigration
status-and usually a combination thereof-probably contribute
as much as sex to the discrimination faced by a "typical" woman in
today's United States.228 Poverty, for example, brings with it a set
of problems that cross the lines of sex, race, national origin, age,
citizenship, or immigration status.229 Typical problems associated
with poverty include the need for food, shelter, and health care.
These needs apply to poor men as well as poor women, whites as
well as blacks, legal as well as undocumented immigrants, and the
young as well as the elderly. In fact, poverty rather than sex has
been the basis underlying those few lawsuits that have been
brought in U.S. courts concerning a possible right to childcare. 230
It is not at all clear that ratification of CEDAW, even if
accompanied by the Senate's advice and consent and enabling
legislation, would actually address the type of discrimination that
is so pervasive in modern U.S. culture.
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the U.S.
Constitution have not managed to end discrimination.
Ratification of CEDAW is no more likely to be successful, and may,
in fact, serve to end the conversation about discrimination against
women and to perpetuate the "identity politics" that foster the
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 6 (1965).
227. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 218 (Christopher Rowe trans., Oxford
University Press 2002) (translating Book VIII, ch. 9, lines 1160a10-13).
228. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 2, at 1242 ("[The violence that many
women experience is often shaped by other dimensions of their identities, such as
race and class."); see also CEDAW, supra note 1, pmbl. (recognizing the importance
of other factors by stating that "in situations of poverty women have the least
access to food, health, education, training and opportunities for employment and
other needs . . . .
229. Cf. Davis & Powell, supra note 132, at 690 (noting that no reported cases
have argued that an employer's denial of childcare discriminated against women or




divisions between men and women.231 It seems at least possible as
of this writing that same-sex civil marriage soon could become
legally and culturally acceptable in the United States. 232 A treaty
that exists solely to address the rights of one sex may have seen its
day come and go. By refusing for so long to ratify CEDAW, the
United States may have missed its opportunity to do so with any
real meaning. Ratification at this point might be meaningless.
Professor Martha Davis and Roslyn Powell have suggested
that human rights treaties might be utilized in U.S. courts even
though the United States is not a party to those treaties. 233 In
arguing for a right to childcare, Davis and Powell demonstrate
that CEDAW, the International Convention on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, all, on some level, provide a basis for the proposition that
working parents are entitled to decent, affordable childcare. 234 If
each treaty covers this area, it is less clear what CEDAW adds to
the mix. It is also worth noting that the United States is not a
party to any of these treaties; it is one of only two U.N. member
states that have not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the
Child.235
Davis and Powell make a convincing argument that domestic
courts ought to recognize the norms embodied in the Convention
on the Rights of the Child in order to provide a meaningful right to
childcare in the United States, which compares unfavorably to
almost every other developed country in this area.236 Further,
231. Crenshaw, supra note 2, at 1242 ("Race, gender, and other identity
categories are most often treated in mainstream liberal discourse as vestiges of bias
or domination-that is, as intrinsically negative frameworks in which social power
works to exclude or marginalize those who are different.").
232. See, e.g., Tim Craig, D.C.'s Gay Marriage Bill May Be Flashpoint, WASH.
POST, Sept. 11, 2009, at Al (describing how, at the time of the article's publication,
"[slame-sex marriages are performed in Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa and
Vermont. They will be legal in New Hampshire in January. The Maine legislature
has approved same-sex marriage, but a referendum will be held on the measure in
November.").
233. Davis & Powell, supra note 132, at 712 ("[R]egardless of whether or not the
United States ultimately ratifies the [Convention on the Rights of the Child], the
treaty's key principles have achieved near-universal acceptance around the globe.
Women's rights advocates should insist that, at the very least, the United States
acknowledge this global consensus by making childcare a national priority here as
well. Doing so would be a significant first step toward recognizing the profound
interrelationship of parents' work and children's well-being and the importance of
childcare as a human right.").
234. Id. at 691-92.
235. Id. at 691.
236. Id. ("By focusing exclusively on domestic law, however, women's rights
advocates have failed to appreciate the strength of international legal norms that
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"CEDAW encourages provision of necessary supportive services to
parents, and urges the 'establishment of a network of childcare
facilities' in participating states."237 It is difficult to imagine what
the U.S. Congress or state legislatures would come up with in
terms of implementing legislation that could accommodate this
one provision of CEDAW.238 Every working parent in the country
would suddenly be guaranteed access to appropriate childcare. It
is hard to imagine a more important accomplishment, but clearly
it has less to do with the parent's sex than with economics,
employment, and education, to name just a few factors.239
Furthermore, it seems beyond the realm of possibility that the
United States will ever recognize such a right; to do so would be
completely out of character for a country that has consistently
declined to even guarantee access to food, shelter, and health care
for its children.240
Ultimately, ratification without a willingness to actually
implement CEDAW would be hollow at best and dangerous at
worst. As long as the United States maintains its place among
dubious company in refusing to ratify the treaty, there is room for
an ongoing conversation about the country's position toward the
treaty's goals and purposes. After ratification, we could anticipate
another thirty years of inaction before there is any movement
toward implementing legislation. Who knows what other
problems may require our attention by then. If drinkable water,
for example, continues to disappear, access to childcare may be the
least of our concerns. The time for a women's treaty may have
already come and gone.
Conclusion
Women in the United States lead lives of abundance
compared to women in many other parts of the world. Most of us
impose an obligation on governments to address childcare needs."). Professor Davis
and Ms. Powell go on to write that "[t]he United States lags far behind the rest of
the world in ensuring that its families have access to childcare as a way to provide
economic opportunity for men and women alike, to equalize gender differences in
the workplace, and to meet the developmental needs of its children." Id. at 692.
Families, men, women, and children are all affected by childcare; it is not just a
"women's issue."
237. Id. at 691-92.
238. See supra notes 143-151 and accompanying text.
239. See Davis & Powell, supra note 132.
240. See id. at 691 (explaining that the United States has declined to sign the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which "squarely imposes on the state an
obligation to assist parents in [the upbringing and development of the child],
particularly when parents are working").
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are educated, are able to vote, live in houses with electricity and
running water, and have the right to choose whether and when we
will become mothers. We go to work at jobs where many of us
earn more money than some of our male colleagues; we seek and
are elected to public office. We are doctors, lawyers, judges,
legislators, senators, CEOs, and Secretaries of State. Yet
discrimination against women persists even here. 241 We are the
victims of domestic violence, slavery, and prostitution. We are
paid less than equally qualified men, and are still in the minority
of positions of power. Our relative reproductive freedom is decided
by courts and legislatures that remain male-dominated.
However, many other groups, whose members include or are
even dominated by women, also continue to face discrimination in
the United States. Poor and middle class people in this country
struggle daily to survive without adequate food, shelter, or health
care.242 A low-income African or Latina immigrant woman in the
United States may share more concerns with a similarly situated
immigrant man than she does with a middle class white woman
like me. Anyone with an Arabic-sounding last name is likely to
face discrimination every day in this country, regardless of sex,
age, or immigration status. The elderly in this country, the
majority of whom are women, are discriminated against in terms
of health care, housing, and employment, for reasons that have
nothing to do with sex. And many African Americans, regardless
of age, sex, religion, or socioeconomic status, have had
unfortunately common experiences with invidious, hateful
241. President Obama's first nomination to the United States Supreme Court
was a Latina, Judge Sonia Sotomayor. The media made much ado about Justice
Sotomayor's past statement "that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her
experiences would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male
who hasn't lived that life." Judge Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge's Voice, Judge
Mario G. Olmos Memorial Lecture at the University of California, Berkeley, School
of Law (October 26, 2001), in 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87, 92 (2002). As a
candidate for the Supreme Court, her race, sex, and ethnicity were the subject of as
much popular attention as were her judicial experience or her legal background.
This symptom of ongoing identity politics is not the sign of a nation that is ready to
commit to the type of equality that is envisioned by CEDAW.
242. Harvard Medical School researchers found that 45,000 deaths per year can
be attributed to lack of health insurance. Reed Abelson, The Cost of Doing Without,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2009, at A22. In a graphic illustration of this abhorrent
statistic, in February of 2007, twelve-year-old Deamonte Driver died when bacteria
from an abscessed tooth spread to his brain. His infected tooth was not extracted
because his family (headed by a single mother) had neither public nor private
health insurance. See Mary Otto, For Want of a Dentist, WASH. POST, Feb. 28,
2007, at B1. The United States is unique among industrialized, western nations in
not having any form of universal health care.
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discrimination. 243
Ratification of CEDAW is not the answer to the
discrimination that is so prevalent in the United States today.
Adding yet another layer of legal protections for women will not
change behavior. Only social movement can accomplish what the
Constitution and laws of this country, and the variety of existing
human rights documents, have not yet accomplished. Ratification
with the currently proposed RUDs would be more likely to set our
country back than to move us forward toward ending
discrimination.
It is certainly true that "the full and complete development
of a country, the welfare of the world and the cause of peace
require the maximum participation of women on equal terms with
men in all fields . ,,244 In order for the United States to make
meaningful progress in this direction, the conversation about
equality must be at least maintained and, ideally, should be
reinvigorated. Ratification of a treaty designed to advance
women's equality may serve only to silence that conversation.
Women ought to learn the lessons of the civil rights and labor
movements in this country, and resist the urge to push for a treaty
that will have no meaning in our lives. We would do well to urge
our President, the Senate, and the Judiciary to work for real
change rather than for the "failed success" that CEDAW could
bring.
243. This situation is particularly true for young African American men, who are
statistically more likely to be arrested, convicted, and imprisoned than any other
demographic group in the United States. See, e.g., Joseph E. Kennedy, The Jena
Six, Mass Incarceration, and the Remoralization of Civil Rights, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 477 (2009) (describing the "mass incarceration" of the African American
community-particularly men).
244. CEDAW, supra note 1, pmbl.
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